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ABSTRACT 
Health care providers with market power enjoy substantially more 
pricing freedom than comparable monopolists in other markets, and 
the reason, which is not generally recognized, is U.S.-style health 
insurance. Monopoly in health care markets, therefore, has 
redistributive effects that are especially burdensome for consumers. 
Significant allocative inefficiencies—albeit not the kind usually 
associated with monopoly—also result, particularly when the 
monopolist is a nonprofit hospital.  We first note the need for a more 
aggressive antitrust policy for the health sector, one that effectively 
prevents the creation of new provider market power through mergers 
and other alliances.  An immediate need is to prevent the formation of 
“accountable care organizations” that integrate providers horizontally 
to achieve market power and not just vertically to achieve efficiency. 
Because it is unlikely that courts or agencies could undo past mergers 
that bestowed providers with monopoly power, we also suggest some 
strategies for contesting existing monopolies.  One strategy is to apply 
antitrust rules against “tying” arrangements so purchasers can contest 
providers’ profit-enhancing practice of overcharging for large bundles 
of services instead of trying to exploit separately the monopolies they 
possess in various submarkets.  Another strategy is to use antitrust or 
regulatory rules to prohibit anticompetitive provisions, such as “anti-
steering” or “most-favored-nation” clauses, in provider-insurer 
contracts. The provider monopoly problem is severe enough that we 
cannot exclude the more radical alternative of regulating provider 
prices. 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
ver since the antitrust laws were first applied systematically in 
the health care sector in the mid-1970s, some judges and 
commentators have resisted giving the statutory policy of fostering 
competition its due effect in health care settings.1  Between 1995 and 
 
1 See infra note 18.  The Supreme Court has consistently overruled lower courts’ 
attempts to infer special antitrust exemptions or craft softer antitrust rules for health care 
providers.  See Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 330–31 (1991) (explaining 
the standard for establishing the potential effect of hospital medical staff decisions on 
interstate commerce); Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 105 (1988) (rejecting state 
legislature’s encouragement of physician peer review in hospitals as a basis for exempting 
abuses from federal antitrust remedies); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 
U.S. 447, 455–57 (1986) (upholding the adequacy of evidence to support the FTC’s 
E
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2000, for example, antitrust enforcers encountered judicial resistance 
when challenging mergers of nonprofit hospitals and suffered a six-
case losing streak in such cases in the federal courts.2  Although most 
of those pro-merger decisions ostensibly turned on findings of fact 
(mostly in identifying a geographic market in which to estimate the 
merger’s probable effects on competition), those findings were often 
so arbitrary as to signify judicial skepticism about the wisdom of 
applying antitrust law rigorously in hospital markets.3  Implicitly, and 
often explicitly, the judges seemed to harbor a belief that nonprofit 
hospitals either would not exercise or would put to good use any 
market power they might possess.4  Although the government has 
 
finding that dentists’ agreement to deny insurers access to patients’ x-rays was 
anticompetitive, not procompetitive); Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 
332, 353–55 (1982) (treating physicians’ collective agreements on maximum prices as 
unlawful partly because the claim of procompetitive effects was facially unconvincing); 
Nat’l Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Ctr. v. Blue Cross of Kansas City, 452 U.S. 378, 
391–93 (1981) (rejecting the implied exemption for market-allocation agreements 
brokered by health-planning agencies created under federal statute).  But see Cal. Dental 
Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756 (1999) (raising the FTC’s burden of proof in 
finding anticompetitive collective action by health professionals).  The last decision is 
critically examined in Clark C. Havighurst, Health Care as a (Big) Business: The Antitrust 
Response, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 939, 949–53 (2001).  The antitrust movement in 
health care was triggered in part by the Supreme Court’s rejection in 1975 of general 
antitrust immunity for the so-called “learned professions.”  See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 
421 U.S. 773, 780, 791–93 (1975).  See generally CARL F. AMERINGER, THE HEALTH 
CARE REVOLUTION: FROM MEDICAL MONOPOLY TO MARKET COMPETITION (2008). 
 For a particularly egregious example of commentators’ recommendations against 
applying antitrust law as written in health care markets, see John A. Norris & David S. 
Szabo, Communication Between the Antitrust and the Health Law Bars: Appeals for More 
Effective Dialogue and a New Rule of Reason, 7 AM. J.L. & MED. xi, xiii (1981) (“Before 
the courts attempt to coerce health care providers into more competitive modes of 
behavior, they should be reasonably certain that more competitive behavior not only is 
possible, but is desirable as well.”). 
2 U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A 
DOSE OF COMPETITION ch. 4, at 1–2 n.7 (2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr 
/public/health_care/204694.pdf. 
3 For discussions of these cases and of the general ambivalence toward competition in 
health care markets, see Martin Gaynor, Why Don’t Courts Treat Hospitals Like Tanks for 
Liquefied Gases? Some Reflections on Health Care Antitrust Enforcement, 31 J. HEALTH 
POL. POL’Y & L. 497 (2006); Thomas L. Greaney, Night Landings on an Aircraft Carrier: 
Hospital Mergers and Antitrust Law, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 191 (1997); Barak D. Richman, 
Antitrust and Nonprofit Hospital Mergers: A Return to Basics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 121 
(2007). 
4 The district judge in FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. 
Mich. 1996), was especially unambiguous in championing nonprofit hospitals as benign 
monopolists: 
Permitting defendant hospitals to achieve the efficiencies of scale that would 
clearly result from the proposed merger would enable the board of directors of 
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more recently won back some of the legal ground thus lost,5 its 
inability over time to apply antitrust law rigorously and systematically 
in the big business that health care has become is one important—
though not the only—reason why many health care markets are now 
dominated by firms with alarming pricing power.6 
The purpose of this Article is to call attention to the fact that 
monopoly power in the hands not only of nonprofit hospitals but also 
of other providers or suppliers of health services or products is in fact 
more, not just equally, harmful to both consumers and the general 
welfare than monopolies of other kinds.  Therefore, we submit, 
mergers and consolidations and other potentially monopolistic 
practices of health care providers—including the very recent wave of 
consolidating market power around so-called accountable care 
organizations7—should be subject to special, not relaxed, vigilance by 
antitrust agencies and courts.  Specifically, we observe (as, 
surprisingly, the antitrust agencies and economists generally have 
 
the combined entity to continue the quest for establishment of world-class health 
facilities in West Michigan, a course the Court finds clearly and unequivocally 
would ultimately be in the best interests of the consuming public as a whole. 
Id. at 1302.  Likewise, the judge revealed a hostility to price competition between 
hospitals, remarking that “[i]n the real world, hospitals are in the business of saving lives, 
and managed care organizations are in the business of saving dollars.”  Id.  The 
Butterworth court was not alone in its predilections.  A Missouri judge, reviewing a 
hospital merger challenged by the FTC, remarked to the federal agency, “I don’t think 
you’ve got any business being in here . . . .  It looks to me like Washington, D.C. once 
again thinks they know better what’s going on in southwest Missouri.  I think they ought 
to stay in D.C.”  Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 263 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(quoting district court hearing). 
5 See infra notes 19–22 and accompanying text. 
6 For surveys of how hospital consolidations have increased hospital prices, see Gloria 
J. Bazzoli et al., Hospital Reorganization and Restructuring Achieved Through Merger, 27 
HEALTH CARE MGMT. REV. 7 (2002); Martin Gaynor, Competition and Quality in Health 
Care Markets, 2 FOUNDS. & TRENDS IN MICROECON. 441 (2006); CLAUDIA H. WILLIAMS 
ET AL., ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., HOW HAS HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATION 
AFFECTED THE PRICE AND QUALITY OF HOSPITAL CARE? (2006), available at 
www.rwjf.org/files/research/no9policybrief.pdf; see also WILLIAM B. VOGT, NAT’L INST. 
FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT. FOUND., HOSPITAL MARKET CONSOLIDATION: TRENDS AND 
CONSEQUENCES (2009), available at http://nihcm.org/pdf/EV-Vogt_FINAL.pdf 
(documenting the extent of provider market concentration among hospitals & other 
providers). 
7 The special problem presented by these entities, provided for in sections 3022 and 
10307 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
124 Stat. 119 (2010), is discussed infra notes 72–83 and accompanying text.  See generally 
Robert Pear, Consumer Risks Feared as Health Law Spurs Mergers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/21/health/policy/21health.html. 
HAVIGHURST 4/6/2011  11:52 AM 
2011] The Provider Monopoly Problem in Health Care 851 
not8) that U.S.-style health insurance greatly enhances the pricing 
freedom of firms possessing market power in health care markets, 
which results in much larger monopoly profits and much greater 
redistributions of wealth than would result from comparable 
monopoly power in markets where consumers face prices directly.  
Moreover, the combination of health insurance and monopoly, 
together with other special features of the health care marketplace, 
also fosters serious inefficiency in the allocation of resources—albeit 
not the kind of misallocation that economic theory normally 
associates with the exercise of monopoly power.9  In our view, 
lawyers and economists wrangling over whether nonprofit hospitals 
or other health care entities behave badly when in possession of 
market power10 have missed the most important points.  The case for 
a rigorous competition policy in the health care sector is significantly 
stronger, we claim, than even its advocates have generally 
appreciated. 
If anything, the major health care reform legislation enacted by 
Congress in 201011 makes even more imperative a strong 
antimonopoly policy in health care.  Designed principally to extend 
generous private health coverage to millions of currently uninsured 
persons,12 the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) 
does little to address the monopoly problem.  On the contrary, despite 
 
8 See infra notes 49–50. 
9 For a more detailed and documented exposition of our observation that U.S.-style 
health insurance inflates the various costs of monopoly in health care markets, see Clark 
C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, Distributive Injustice(s) in American Health Care, 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2006, at 7, 13–31. 
10 See U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, ch. 4, at 29–
33 (citing cases and commentary on the significance of hospitals’ nonprofit versus for-
profit status). 
11 PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119. 
12 Ironically, these individuals’ previous lack of such insurance long provided a 
plausible justification for not requiring nonprofit hospitals to face effective price 
competition; only by generating extraordinary surpluses, many believed, could such 
hospitals cover the uncompensated costs of treating the uninsured.  See infra notes 33–39 
and accompanying text.  The irony is that the legislation, while reducing providers’ need 
to dispense such charity, will leave in place the monopolies previously tolerated largely 
because of the alleged need to generate charitable resources. 
 A further irony emerges from empirical evidence suggesting that hospitals able to 
exercise market power—and thus able to generate large surpluses in treating privately 
insured patients—allow their overall costs to rise to a point where they lose money treating 
Medicare patients.  Jeffrey Stensland et al., Private-Payer Profits Can Induce Negative 
Medicare Margins, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1045 (2010).  In other words, the conventional 
wisdom that high uncompensated care costs cause cost shifting and higher charges to 
private payers is at least somewhat backward.  See id. 
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the immense implications for the nation’s precarious economic future 
of the new rights, entitlements, and subsidies it embodies, the PPACA 
seems certain to add substantially to providers’ and suppliers’ 
profits.13  Yet, its potential to further enrich industry monopolists 
went largely undiscussed in the debates preceding its enactment.14  
Democrats, who might normally be expected to object to monopoly’s 
redistributive consequences, mostly avoided the issue because they 
feared losing industry support for their symbolically important reform 
project.15 Republicans, though decrying the proposed bill’s potential 
costs to consumers and taxpayers, were unspecific about its potential 
for overpaying providers, a political constituency that they, like the 
Democrats, were reluctant to offend.  Regrettably, the resulting 
legislation may give the nation the worst of both worlds: on the one 
hand, an insurance market lacking the incentives and room for 
competitive innovations that are essential if insurers are to counteract 
powerful cost drivers and, on the other hand, regulatory mechanisms 
incapable of compensating effectively and sensitively for the absence 
of reliable market forces.16  Unless an effective competition policy (or 
 
13 Most significantly, the new law’s encouragement of accountable care organizations is 
likely to increase providers’ pricing freedom and is already having adverse effects on 
competition.  See supra note 7.  In addition, section 1001 of the PPACA adds section 
2718(a) to the Public Health Service Act, which mandates that insurers maintain high 
medical-loss ratios (that is, incur low administrative costs), thereby possibly limiting what 
insurers will be able to do administratively to contest providers’ market power and 
otherwise curb the cost-increasing effects of moral hazard associated with open-ended 
health coverage.  See infra notes 53–54 and accompanying text (observing that 
uncontestable moral hazard ultimately explains the extraordinary profitability of provider 
and supplier monopolies in health care). 
14 A recent examination of California markets documents “providers’ growing market 
power to negotiate higher payment rates from private insurers,” calling it “‘the elephant in 
the room’ that is rarely mentioned.”  Robert A. Berenson et al., Unchecked Provider Clout 
in California Foreshadows Challenges to Health Reform, 29 HEALTH AFF. 699, 699 
(2010).  For dramatic evidence of increased provider market power in Massachusetts (an 
early adopter of health reform that served as a model for the federal effort), see infra notes 
27–32 and accompanying text. 
15 President Obama’s cultivation of provider support for the Democrats’ bill was 
apparent at a speech where he appeared in the White House East Room with numerous 
physicians in white coats both on stage and in the audience.  See President Barack Obama, 
Moving Forward on Health Care Reform (Mar. 3, 2010), available at http://www 
.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-health-care-reform. 
16 For early warnings, directed principally to conservatives, about the unworkability of a 
private market for health care absent major reforms of tax and legal policy, see Clark C. 
Havighurst, Decentralizing Decision Making: Private Contract Versus Professional 
Norms, in MARKET REFORMS IN HEALTH CARE: CURRENT ISSUES, NEW DIRECTIONS, 
STRATEGIC DECISIONS 22 (Jack A. Meyer ed., 1983); Clark C. Havighurst, Why Preserve 
Private Health Care Financing?, in AMERICAN HEALTH POLICY: CRITICAL ISSUES FOR 
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some workable alternative) can be implemented in the health sector, 
more than thirty million additional persons will soon be forced to 
carry exactly the kind of health coverage that currently serves 
provider and supplier monopolists so well. 
Most of this Article develops new insights that should cause 
antitrust enforcers and courts or other regulators to scrutinize future 
health-sector mergers, the creation of accountable care organizations, 
and providers’ other potentially monopolistic practices with special 
skepticism, thus preventing further market concentration.  However, 
because consumer welfare also requires that existing concentration be 
reduced and competition intensified in markets for provider services, 
we conclude by briefly considering how deconcentration and the 
restoration of price competition might occur.  In the belief that payers 
could do more to circumvent and thereby weaken specific provider 
monopolies, we suggest how antitrust agencies, courts, and regulators 
with authority over insurers’ contracts with providers and consumers 
might facilitate the emergence of effective price competition in 
concentrated markets.  Monopolies might be overcome, for example, 
by rigorously applying antitrust principles or otherwise enabling 
private payers to negotiate more competitive prices for specific 
provider services.  Our discussion is meant to induce hope that the 
pricing freedom of health-sector monopolies can be significantly 
reduced by payers facing strong competitive pressures to control costs 
and reduce premiums.  We would be less hopeful and enthusiastic 
about second-best, inevitably politicized strategies, such as imposing 
price regulation or empowering a single public payer to dictate 
provider prices. 
This Article uses the hitherto underappreciated dangers of letting 
nonprofit hospitals attain and exercise market power to illustrate the 
larger provider monopoly problem facing today’s insurers, 
consumers, and policy makers.  Our arguments also apply to 
providers and suppliers of other kinds.17 
 
REFORM 87 (Robert B. Helms ed., 1993).  For an account of failed efforts to create a 
responsible, market-driven health care system, including a discussion of how regulatory 
politics disserve ordinary Americans, see Clark C. Havighurst, How the Health Care 
Revolution Fell Short, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2002, at 55. 
17 For a discussion of how, for example, pharmaceutical companies similarly exploit 
monopoly power in health care markets, with price and efficiency consequences more 
severe than those usually associated with monopoly, see Havighurst & Richman, supra 
note 9, at 24–28 (discussing how U.S.-style health insurance magnifies drug company 
profits and distorts innovation incentives). 
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II 
SHOULD NONPROFIT PROVIDERS BE ENTRUSTED WITH MARKET 
POWER? 
The monopoly problem in health care markets is much greater 
today because too many judges and commentators have chosen to 
view competition as inappropriate in health care or nonprofit hospitals 
as benign servers of the public interest rather than as potential 
monopolists against whom consumers need antitrust protection.18  
Specifically, antitrust agencies have found it difficult to convince 
courts both that nonprofit community hospitals would be likely to use 
any market power they achieve to raise prices and that, if they did, it 
would necessarily be a bad thing. 
A.  Pricing Practices 
In 2007, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), in a case 
challenging a merger of nonprofit hospitals on Chicago’s North 
Shore, found convincing proof that, following the merger, the new 
entity had substantially raised prices for managed-care 
organizations.19  The case was unusual because, rather than 
 
18 Whatever one’s prior beliefs about the merits of competition in health care, the 
antitrust laws are the law of the land and should be applied by courts without second-
guessing the deep-rooted statutory policy of maintaining competitive markets.  Indeed, in 
1898, then Circuit Judge William Howard Taft famously warned against relying on “the 
vague and varying opinion of judges as to how much, on principles of political economy, 
men ought to be allowed to restrain competition.”  United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel 
Co., 85 F. 271, 283 (6th Cir. 1898).  Compare id. with Norris & Szabo, supra note 1.  For 
a nonlawyer’s observation that those who endorse enforcement of the antitrust laws in 
medical markets often sound like members of “a religious cult,” see Mark Schlesinger, 
Markets as Belief Systems and Those Who Keep the Faith, 31 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 
417, 420 (2006).  To be sure, antitrust experts who criticized the line of cases allowing 
mergers of nonprofit hospitals often indicated their own conviction that allowing 
monopoly in hospital markets would harm, not benefit, consumers.  See supra note 3.  But 
those who question antitrust enforcement in the health sector because of their own policy 
assumptions or preferences are subversive in a way that those who advocate rigorous 
enforcement of laws already on the books are not.  In any case, even if antimonopoly 
efforts in health care must be defended on policy (and not just legal) grounds, it is 
irrelevant whether in theory or in fact competition can or cannot, either under current 
circumstances or with appropriate reforms, yield socially optimal results in the health care 
sector.  In a hospital merger case, for example, it should be enough that “monopoly power 
is worse than the alternative” and that “monopoly harms health care consumers just [as] it 
harms the consumers of conventional products.”  Gaynor, supra note 3 at 502, 504.  Our 
argument, of course, is that monopoly is unusually, not just ordinarily, harmful to 
consumers of health care. 
19 Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., 2007 WL 2286195, at *53 (F.T.C. 2007). 
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intervening to stop the acquisition when it was first proposed, the 
FTC initiated its challenge four years after the merger was 
consummated.  Bringing the case at that stage accomplished two 
things:  First, it made it unnecessary for the FTC to seek a preliminary 
injunction against the merger in federal court—where antitrust 
enforcers had lost the six previous cases.  Second, challenging a 
completed merger gave the FTC’s staff an opportunity to demonstrate 
in fact, and not just in theory, that nonprofit hospitals gaining new 
market power will use it to increase prices.  The direct proof obtained 
in the Evanston Northwestern case makes it unlikely that future 
federal courts will allow the consummation of mergers of nonprofit 
hospitals under the illusion that such mergers do not have the usual 
anticompetitive effects. 
The FTC’s findings in Evanston Northwestern also discredited 
expert economic testimony that the Butterworth court had cited 
prominently in approving the Grand Rapids, Michigan, hospital 
merger.20  That testimony rested on empirical research purporting to 
show that, in concentrated markets, nonprofit hospitals generally had 
lower prices than corresponding for-profit hospitals.21  Although that 
research was effectively discredited in later economic studies,22 the 
facts found in Evanston Northwestern should finally put to rest the 
notion that nonprofit hospitals are immune from the temptation to 
raise prices when they are in a position to do so. 
Evanston Northwestern’s findings also undercut the common belief 
that community leaders on a nonprofit hospital’s governing board are 
vigilant about health care costs.  The judge in Butterworth permitted 
the merger in part because the chairmen of the two hospitals’ boards 
each represented a large local employer and “testified convincingly 
that the proposed merger [was] motivated by a common desire to 
 
20 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1303 (W.D. 
Mich. 1996). 
21 Id. at 1297 (citing an expert’s “findings suggest[ing] that a substantial increase in 
market concentration among nonprofit hospitals is not likely to result in price increases”).  
The expert cited by the court, William J. Lynk, reached the same conclusion in scholarly 
articles.  William J. Lynk, Nonprofit Hospital Mergers and the Exercise of Market Power, 
38 J.L. & ECON. 437, 459 (1995); William J. Lynk, Property Rights and the Presumptions 
of Merger Analysis, 39 ANTITRUST BULL. 363, 377 (1994). 
22 See U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, ch. 4, at 33 
(concluding “the best available evidence indicates that nonprofits exploit market power 
when given the opportunity to do so”); David Dranove & Richard Ludwick, Competition 
and Pricing by Nonprofit Hospitals: A Reassessment of Lynk’s Analysis, 18 J. HEALTH 
ECON. 87 (1999); Emmett B. Keeler et al., The Changing Effects of Competition on Non-
Profit and For-Profit Hospital Pricing Behavior, 18 J. HEALTH ECON. 69 (1999). 
HAVIGHURST 4/6/2011  11:52 AM 
856 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89, 847 
lower health care costs.”23  In this same vein, a proponent of another 
hospital merger in 2007 gave assurance that allowing the merger 
would not cause health insurance premiums to increase because 
several hospital “board members . . . are employers who worry about 
the cost of health-care.”24  Economists generally agree, however, that 
employees themselves, not employers, ultimately bear the cost of 
their own health coverage in reduced wages or fringe benefits.25  To 
be sure, employers are never happy to pay higher insurance premiums 
and would prefer to increase their employees’ compensation in more 
visible ways.  But they are ultimately committing their workers’ 
money, not their own (or their shareholders’), in hospital boardrooms.  
Moreover, nonprofit hospitals have few legal or institutional reasons 
to engage in only progressive redistribution.26  In general, community 
leaders on nonprofit hospital boards have little incentive to resist any 
hospital project that seems good for the community if it can be 
financed from the hospital’s reserves and future surpluses. 
A recent report by the Massachusetts Attorney General documents 
how nonprofit hospitals in Massachusetts have aggressively exploited 
their market power, even when health care costs were strangling 
public and private budgets.27  Following Massachusetts’s passage of 
the nation’s first legislative effort to achieve universal health 
coverage, the state legislature directed the Attorney General to 
analyze the causes of rising health care costs.  The resulting report 
concluded that prices for health services are uncorrelated with either 
quality or costs of care but instead are positively correlated with 
 
23 Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1297. 
24 Felice J. Freyer, Hospital Merger Reaction Cautious, PROVIDENCE J., July 29, 2007, 
http://www.projo.com/news/content/HOSPITAL_FOLO_07-29-07_KS6HQED.32ff750 
.html (describing the proposed merger of Rhode Island’s two largest hospital systems); see 
also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. 1213, 1222 (W.D. Mo. 1995) 
(“[I]f a nonprofit organization is controlled by the very people who depend on it for 
service, there is no rational economic incentive for such an organization to raise its prices 
to the monopoly level even if it has the power to do so.”). 
25 See generally Jonathan Gruber, Health Insurance and the Labor Market (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6762, 1998) (reviewing the empirical 
literature and finding “a fairly uniform result: the costs of health insurance are fully shifted 
to wages”). 
26 See infra notes 34–38 and accompanying text; see also Timothy Greaney & Kathleen 
Boozang, Mission, Market and Trust in the Nonprofit Healthcare Enterprise, 5 YALE J. 
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1 (2005); Havighurst & Richman, supra note 9, at 22–24. 
27 OFFICE OF MASS. ATT’Y GEN. MARTHA COAKLEY, EXAMINATION OF HEALTH CARE 
COST TRENDS AND COST DRIVERS PURSUANT TO G.L. C. 118G, § 6½(b) (2010), available 
at http://www.mass.gov/Cago/docs/healthcare/final_report_w_cover_appendices_glossary 
.pdf [hereinafter HEALTH CARE COST TRENDS]. 
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provider market power.28  The report further observed that prominent, 
nonprofit, academic medical centers—specifically, the Massachusetts 
General Hospital and Brigham and Women’s Hospital, which had 
merged in 1993 to create Partners HealthCare—were most 
responsible for leveraging their market and reputational power to 
extract high prices from insurers.29  Reporting by The Boston Globe 
had previously shown the surprising extent to which Partners was able 
to extract extraordinary prices in agreements with presumably cost-
conscious insurers.30  For example, when some insurers, such as the 
Tufts Health Plan, resisted Partners’ demands for price increases and 
tried to assemble networks with Boston’s other hospitals, Partners 
launched an aggressive marketing campaign that triggered threats by 
many of Tufts’ corporate customers to switch insurers.31  Later 
discussion remarks on the monopolistic, price-increasing effects of 
certain anticompetitive provisions insisted on by Partners in its 
contracts with insurers.32 
The foregoing observations should finally dispel any impression 
that nonprofit hospitals, as community institutions, can safely be 
allowed to possess market power on the theory that, as nonprofits, 
they can be trusted not to exercise it. 
B.  Charitable Activities 
Federal judges may have tolerated mergers conferring new market 
power on nonprofit hospitals less because they thought the hospitals 
would not exercise that power than because such hospitals seemed to 
differ from conventional monopolists in ways that should lessen 
 
28 Id. at 16–33. 
29 Id. at 29–30. 
30 A Handshake That Made Healthcare History, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 28, 2008; Spotlight: 
Unhealthy System, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 28, 2008, http://www.boston.com/news/specials 
/healthcare_spotlight/; Fueled by Profits, a Healthcare Giant Takes Aim at Suburbs, BOS. 
GLOBE, Dec. 21, 2008; A Healthcare System Badly Out of Balance, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 16, 
2008. 
31 A Handshake That Made Healthcare History, supra note 30 (describing the 
“humiliation” experienced by the Tufts Health Plan’s CEO as he caved to Partners’ price 
demands and “became an object lesson for other insurers, a lesson they would not soon 
forget [as the] balance of power had shifted” to Partners).  In Orlando, insurer United 
Healthcare experienced similar threats as it resisted a request for a sixty-three percent price 
increase by the region’s leading nonprofit hospital chain.  Linda Shrieves, Florida 
Hospital-United Healthcare Face-Off Spurs Fear, Anger, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 6, 
2010, http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2010-08-06/business/os-insurance-negotiations-2 
0100806_1_switch-doctors-new-doctors-county-employees. 
32 See infra notes 90–95. 
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social concern about their enrichment.  Specifically, nonprofit, tax-
exempt hospitals are required by their charters and the federal tax 
code to retain their profits and use them only for “charitable” 
purposes.  Thus, if one could assume that the redistributions of wealth 
resulting from the exercise of market power by nonprofit hospitals run 
generally from richer to poorer rather than in the opposite direction, 
there would be at least an argument for viewing nonprofit hospital 
monopolies as benign for antitrust purposes.  Although such an 
argument would be based on a questionable reading of the antitrust 
statutes, one widely noted case allowed prestigious universities to act 
anti-competitively in order to direct their limited scholarship funds 
toward lower-income students.33  One easily senses in hospital 
merger cases a similar judicial dispensation in favor of nonprofit 
enterprises that combine for seemingly progressive purposes.34 
But however antitrust doctrine views (or should view) monopolies 
dedicated to progressive pursuits, it is far from clear that nonprofit 
hospitals reliably use their dominant market positions to redistribute 
wealth only in progressive directions.  The Internal Revenue Code’s 
charitable-purposes requirement has been interpreted very broadly, 
allowing such hospitals to spend their untaxed surpluses on anything 
that arguably “promotes health.”35  This includes much more than just 
caring for the indigent.  Indeed, many exempt hospitals are located in 
areas that need relatively little in the way of truly charitable care, 
either because the community is relatively affluent and its population 
well insured or because a public hospital assumes most of the charity 
burden.  Moreover, although all hospitals inevitably subsidize the 
treatment of some uninsured patients, many of today’s uninsured are 
members of the middle class and not obvious candidates for subsidies 
 
33 United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 678–79 (3d Cir. 1993).  Reading this 
ruling as an endorsement of the universities’ redirection of scholarship funds to needier 
students would at least limit substantially (and prudently) the kind of worthy purpose a 
cartel of nonprofit entities may offer as an antitrust defense.  See supra note 18 (citing 
Addyston Pipe’s warning against judicial discretion, including the consideration of worthy-
purpose defenses, in applying antitrust law). 
34 See, e.g., supra note 4. 
35 Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.  Ironically, this controversial ruling, relaxing an 
earlier requirement that an exempt hospital “must be operated to the extent of its financial 
ability for those not able to pay for the services rendered,” Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 
202, came at a time when the Medicare and Medicaid programs were relatively new and 
private health insurance was expanding, all seemingly reducing the need for nonprofit 
hospitals to be charitable in the original sense. 
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from the insured population.36  Finally, federal, state, and local 
governments separately and substantially subsidize nonprofit 
hospitals’ most clearly charitable activities, both through special tax 
exemptions and relief and by direct subventions; such activities 
therefore should not count significantly in estimating the net direction 
of redistributions effected by hospitals through the exercise of newly 
acquired market power. 
Thus, true charity has in recent years accounted for only a 
relatively small fraction of what nonprofit hospitals do in return for 
their federal tax exemptions.  Indeed, such hospitals can usually 
qualify for exemption merely by spending their surpluses on medical 
research, on training various types of health care personnel, and, most 
importantly, on acquiring state-of-the-art facilities and equipment, 
which (ironically) can also secure and enhance their market 
dominance.37  Many of these activities confer significant benefits on 
interests and individuals relatively high on the income scale.38  To be 
 
36 Supplemental census data from 2007 showed that nearly thirty-eight percent of 
America’s uninsured come from households with over $50,000 in annual income and 
nearly twenty percent from households with over $75,000.  See CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT 
ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 
IN THE UNITED STATES: 2006, at 21 tbl.6 (2007), available at http://www.census.gov/prod 
/2007pubs/p60-233.pdf.  Implementation of the PPACA will greatly reduce hospitals’ 
charity burdens, leaving undocumented immigrants as the principal category of the 
uninsured. 
37 See infra notes 54–55 and accompanying text.  On Partners HealthCare’s use of its 
surpluses to build new and better facilities and expand into new markets, thereby securing 
additional market power, see Fueled by Profits, a Healthcare Giant Takes Aim at Suburbs, 
supra note 30. 
 Not only does tax exemption create opportunities for dominant firms to increase their 
dominance, but a nonprofit firm lacking such dominance may be ineligible for 
exemption—and thus at a severe competitive disadvantage—precisely because it faces 
competition and therefore lacks the discretionary funds necessary to demonstrate how it 
“benefits the community.”  Tax policy thus rewards, fosters, and protects provider 
monopoly, ensuring only that monopoly profits, however large, are not put to 
objectionable, non-health-related uses.  Cf. Geisinger Health Plan v. Comm’r, 985 F.2d 
1210, 1214 (3d Cir. 1993) (denying tax exemption to a nonprofit health plan because it did 
not provide direct health services and because, despite planned subsidies for low-income 
subscribers, it had “been unable to support the program with operating funds because it 
operated at a loss from its inception”). 
38 Many physicians, for example, benefit handsomely, first, from the valuable training 
hospitals provide and, later, from using expensive hospital facilities and equipment at no 
direct cost to themselves.  The tax authorities regard such “private benefits” as merely 
“incidental” to the hospitals’ larger purpose of promoting the health of the community.  
See I.R.S. G.C.M. 39,862 (Dec. 2, 1991). 
In our view, some private benefit is present in all typical hospital-physician 
relationships . . . .  Though the private benefit is compounded in the case of 
certain specialists, such as heart transplant surgeons, who depend heavily on 
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sure, most of the activities and projects financed from hospital 
surpluses are hard to criticize in the abstract.  But many of them are 
not so obviously progressive in their redistributive effects (or 
otherwise so obviously worthy of public support) that antitrust 
prohibitions should be relaxed so hospitals can finance more of them. 
In any case, financing hospital activities and projects of any kind 
from hospitals’ monopoly profits causes their costs to fall ultimately 
and more or less equally on individuals bearing the cost of health 
insurance premiums.  The incidence of this financial burden thus 
closely resembles that of a “head tax”—that is, a tax levied equally on 
individuals regardless of their income or ability to pay.  Few methods 
of public finance are more unfair (regressive) than this.  Those who 
take a benign view of the seemingly good works of health care 
providers should focus more attention on who (ultimately) pays for 
and who benefits from those nominally charitable activities.39 
The regressive redistributive effects of nonprofit hospitals’ 
monopolies appear never to have been given due weight in antitrust 
appraisals of hospital mergers.40  To be sure, pure economic theory 
withholds judgment on the rightness or wrongness of redistributing 
income because economists have no objective basis for preferring one 
distribution of wealth over another.  But the antitrust laws enjoy 
general political support principally because the consuming public 
resents the idea of illegitimate monopolists enriching themselves at 
their expense.41  This is why mergers of all kinds are suspect in the 
eyes of antitrust enforcers; they may be an easy and unjustified 
shortcut to gaining market power.  Although proponents of 
consolidations increasing concentration in provider markets usually 
 
highly specialized hospital facilities, that fact alone will not make the private 
benefit more than incidental. 
Id. 
39 See generally Symposium, Who Pays? Who Benefits? Distributional Issues in Health 
Care, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2006, at 1; Havighurst & Richman, supra note 
9. 
40 Under reasonable assumptions, a hospital merger creating new market power would 
raise insurance premiums by roughly three percent, increasing the “head tax” on the 
median insured family by roughly $400 per year, hardly a trivial amount.  In addition, 
according to one estimate, hospital mergers in the 1990s caused nearly 700,000 Americans 
to lose their private health insurance.  Robert Town et al., The Welfare Consequences of 
Hospital Mergers (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12,244, 2006). 
41 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION 
AND ITS PRACTICE 50 (3d ed. 2005) (“[T]he primary intent of the Sherman Act’s framer 
was . . . the distributive goal of preventing monopolists from transferring wealth away 
from consumers.”). 
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tout the efficiencies they expect to achieve by combining and 
rationalizing operations, the opportunity to increase their bargaining 
power vis-à-vis private payers is the likelier explanation for all such 
mergers in concentrated markets.42  In any event, the ubiquity of 
nonprofit hospitals with market power now constitutes a significant 
source of the provider monopoly problem in health care. 
III 
HOW HEALTH INSURANCE COMPOUNDS THE HARMS OF PROVIDER 
MONOPOLY 
In economic theory, monopoly is objectionable because the higher 
prices it enables a seller to charge cause some consumers who would 
happily pay the competitive price to forgo enjoyment of the 
monopolized good or service, thus diverting scarce resources to less-
valued uses and reducing aggregate welfare.  Fortunately, such 
output- and welfare-reducing (misallocative) effects are greatly 
lessened in health care markets because the large number of patients 
with health insurance can easily pay provider monopolists’ asking 
prices for desirable goods or services rather than being induced to 
forgo their consumption.43  Unfortunately, however, health insurance 
has other, possibly more severe consequences because it both 
amplifies the redistributive effects of provider/supplier monopolies 
and contributes to allocative inefficiency of a different and arguably 
more serious kind.  It is mainly to highlight the adverse, synergistic 
 
42 See DAVID DRANOVE, THE ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE: 
FROM MARCUS WELBY TO MANAGED CARE 122 (2000) (“I have asked many providers 
why they wanted to merge.  Although publicly they all invoked the synergies mantra, 
virtually everyone stated privately that the main reason for merging was to avoid 
competition and/or obtain market power.”); see also Berenson et al., supra note 14, at 704 
(quoting a local physician as saying, “Why are those hospitals and physicians 
[integrating]?  It wasn’t for increased coordination of care, disease management, blah, 
blah, blah—that was not the primary reason.  They wanted more money and market 
share.”).  For more particular reasons to discount efficiency claims in evaluating health-
sector mergers, see infra note 65. 
43 To the extent that uninsured patients cannot pay hospitals’ high prices, monopoly still 
causes allocative inefficiency of the usual kind (not to mention its adverse consequences 
for patients’ health).  But many uninsured are treated free of charge or at reduced rates—
an instance of price discrimination somewhat ameliorating monopoly’s usual misallocative 
tendency.  Although providers’ pricing freedom certainly harms many lacking health 
insurance coverage, the principal emphasis here is on the combined effects of insurance 
and monopoly on both those with coverage and the economy as a whole.  Because the 
PPACA is intended to increase the number of consumers with coverage, it seems certain to 
increase the redistributive consequences of health-sector monopolies. 
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effects of combining health insurance and monopoly that we have 
written this Article. 
A.  Health-Sector Monopolies and the Redistribution of Wealth 
At the same time that health insurance ameliorates monopoly’s 
usual adverse effects on output and allocative efficiency, it greatly 
exacerbates monopoly’s other objectionable effect, the redistribution 
of wealth from consumers to powerful firms.44  In the textbook 
model, the monopolist’s higher price enables it to capture for itself 
much of the welfare gain, or “surplus,” that consumers would have 
enjoyed if they had been able to purchase the valued good or service 
at a low, competitive price.  In health care, insurance puts the 
monopolist in an even stronger position by greatly weakening the 
constraint on its pricing freedom ordinarily imposed by the limits of 
consumers’ willingness or ability to pay.  This effect appears in 
theory as a steepening of the demand curve for the monopolized good 
or service.  The extraordinary profits that health insurance makes 
available to powerful sellers are earned mostly at the expense not of 
direct purchasers—insurers or patients—but of consumers bearing the 
cost of insurance. 
Even under orthodox theory, therefore, health insurance enables a 
monopolist of a covered service to charge substantially more than the 
textbook “monopoly price,”45 thus earning even more than the usual 
“monopoly profit.”  As serious as this added redistributive effect may 
be in theory, however, it is rendered even more serious in practice by 
certain deficiencies in the design and administration of real-world 
health insurance.  For legal, regulatory, and other reasons, health 
insurers in the United States are in no position (as consumers 
themselves would be) to refuse to pay a provider’s high price 
whenever it appears to exceed the service’s likely value to the patient.  
Instead, insurers are bound by both deep-rooted convention and their 
 
44 See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 9, at 13–31. 
45 It is artificial (but not inaccurate) to speak of a hospital’s “price” for a monopolized 
service because hospitals and private payers typically do not negotiate prices service-by-
service but instead agree on a standard discount from the hospital’s (uniformly high) list 
prices or on a standard markup from cost-related Medicare allowances.  See Christopher P. 
Tompkins et al., The Precarious Pricing System for Hospital Services, 25 HEALTH AFF. 
45, 50 (2006).  The amount of the discount will be less, or the markup more, however, to 
whatever extent the hospital enjoys market power over individual services.  In practice, a 
purchaser cannot easily refuse to deal with a hospital or any other provider that possesses a 
monopoly over any significant service.  See infra notes 85–90 and accompanying text.  But 
see infra note 48. 
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contracts with subscribers to pay for any service that is deemed 
advantageous (and termed “medically necessary”) for the patient’s 
health, whatever that service may cost.46  Consequently, available 
“close substitutes” for a provider’s services do not check its market 
power as they ordinarily would do.  Indeed, putting aside the modest 
effects of cost sharing on patients’ choices,47 the only substitute 
treatments or services that insured patients will accept are those they 
regard as perfect ones.48  Unlike the situation when an ordinary 
monopolist sells directly to cost-conscious consumers, the rewards to 
 
46 See infra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.  Although it is possible to imagine a 
contract that authorizes a health plan to compare benefits and costs in administering its 
coverage (in order to give its members only what they collectively deem it economical to 
pay for), the practical, legal, and political difficulties that insurers would encounter in thus 
rationing their coverage have generally precluded the use of such contracts in the U.S. 
market.  See also Mark V. Pauly, Competition and New Technology, 24 HEALTH AFF. 
1523 (2005) (recognizing, as few economists have, the importance of the practical 
inability of consumers to purchase health insurance that provides only selective coverage 
of costly technology).  See generally CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: 
PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH REFORM (1995).  Indeed, even when 
managed care was in the ascendant in the 1990s, health plans did not undertake to ration 
their coverage on the basis of cost-benefit comparisons.  The inability of insurers to 
control costs optimally as agents of their insureds results not only from the difficulty of 
writing, administering, and enforcing the requisite contracts but also from the tax system’s 
exclusion of employer payments for health coverage from their employees’ taxable 
income; with employers paying most of the premium, workers have been unaware of the 
true cost of their coverage to themselves and thus unduly resistant to cost-saving measures.  
See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
47 Although cost sharing’s low administrative costs and relatively non-controversial 
nature make it the mechanism of choice for rationing health coverage (to offset moral 
hazard), it may operate unfairly in insured groups comprising individuals with differing 
incomes.  For discussion of the hypothesis that cost sharing unfairly enables those patients 
who are better able to pay the up-front charge to obtain disproportionate access to the 
premium pool, see Havighurst & Richman, supra note 9, at 41–49. 
48 Patients’ hesitancy to accept lower-cost substitutes for top-shelf services or products 
is partly a result of the usual market failures associated with the provision of health 
services, particularly patients’ difficulty in evaluating the quality of or necessity for 
particular care and the agency problems that arise from patients’ inevitable reliance on 
physician advice rarely influenced by patient or insurer cost or price concerns.  These 
factors explain how a provider with market power can charge dramatically higher prices 
for services that are similarly offered by other providers in the same market.  See PAUL B. 
GINSBURG, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, RESEARCH BRIEF NO. 16: WIDE 
VARIATION IN HOSPITAL AND PHYSICIAN PAYMENT RATES EVIDENCE OF PROVIDER 
MARKET POWER (2010), available at http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/1162/1162 
.pdf.  These factors also explain the phenomenon of “must-have” providers, especially 
hospitals, which consumers insist on having in their insurer’s provider networks regardless 
of the adequacy of less expensive alternatives.  In these cases, reputational advantages, 
whether deserved or not, translate into providers’ extraordinary pricing freedom.  See, e.g., 
Berenson et al., supra note 14, at 702 (identifying “must-have” hospitals in California 
markets); supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
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a monopolist selling goods or services purchased through health 
insurance may easily and substantially exceed the aggregate consumer 
surplus that patients would derive at competitive prices. 
Discussions of antitrust issues in the health care sector rarely, if 
ever, explicitly observe how health insurance in general or U.S.-style 
insurance in particular enhances the ability of dominant sellers to 
exploit consumers.49  Most notably, the special, redistributive effects 
of monopoly in health care markets are not mentioned in the antitrust 
agencies’ definitive statements of enforcement policy in the health 
care sector.50  Yet, the effect we identify has potentially huge 
implications for consumers and the general welfare and thus for 
antitrust analysis not only of hospital mergers but also of other actions 
or practices capable of enhancing provider or supplier market power.  
The nation will find it far harder—perhaps literally impossible—to 
afford PPACA’s impending extension of generous health coverage to 
additional millions of consumers if monopolists of health care 
services and products can continue to charge whatever prices 
insurers—not “the market”—will bear. 
B.  Misallocative as Well as Redistributive Consequences 
Allowing nonprofit hospitals or other providers to gain market 
power by merger not only causes extraordinary redistributions of 
wealth but also contributes to inefficiency in the allocation of 
resources.  In ironic contrast to the output restrictions associated with 
 
49 But see Havighurst & Richman, supra note 9, at 13–31.  Economists have (only 
belatedly, it seems) recognized the effects of health insurance on the value of patent 
monopolies in the health sector, with particular reference to possible effects on innovation 
incentives.  See Alan M. Garber et al., Insurance and Incentives for Medical Innovation 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12,080, 2006) (citing the possibility 
that innovation incentives might be excessive); Darius Lakdawalla & Neeraj Sood, 
Insurance and Innovation in Health Care Markets (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 11,602, 2005) (suggesting how, under certain assumptions, innovation 
incentives might be optimal).  For a recent demonstration that “[m]arket power in the 
health care market is . . . exacerbated by the feedback into insurance demand, leading to 
high health care prices,” see Rhema Vaithianathan, Health Insurance and Imperfect 
Competition in the Health Care Market, 25 J. HEALTH ECON. 1193, 1194 (2006).  The last 
article, however, seems not to incorporate insights from the way health insurers actually 
purchase services (e.g., by selectively contracting with providers) or the handicaps under 
which they operate in counteracting moral hazard.  See infra notes 53–54 and 
accompanying text. 
50 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE 8–11 (1996), available at http://www.justice 
.gov/atr/public/guidelines/1791.pdf; see also U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, supra note 2. 
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monopoly in economic theory, however, the misallocative effects 
cited here mostly involve the production and consumption of too 
much (rather than too little) of a generally good thing.51  As we show 
briefly here, these misallocations are both theoretically and practically 
important, and they provide still another new reason for special 
antitrust and other vigilance against providers’ monopolistic practices, 
particularly including anticompetitive mergers and consolidations and 
powerful joint ventures.52 
Even in the absence of monopoly, conventional health insurance 
enables consumers and providers to overspend on overly costly health 
care.  This is, of course, the familiar effect of moral hazard—
economists’ term for the tendency of patients and providers to spend 
insurers’ money more freely than they would spend the patient’s own.  
To be sure, some moral-hazard costs are justified as an unavoidable 
 
51 But see supra note 43. 
52 Allocative efficiency is sometimes questioned as a theoretical justification for 
antitrust policy because of the so-called “problem of second best.”  This technical 
objection to the promotion of competition originates in the observation that factors such as 
lawful and unlawful monopoly, regulation, trade barriers, and taxes cause many goods and 
services throughout the economy to be priced in excess of the marginal costs of producing 
them, making it hard to maintain that intensifying price competition in any given market 
will necessarily improve overall resource allocation.  The second best issue seems to be 
taken most seriously by those skeptical about relatively free markets.  See, e.g., 
Schlesinger, supra note 18 (raising this objection to competition in health care but 
confusing it somewhat with externality problems that arise because certain costs and 
benefits are not borne or captured by the parties to private transactions); Lawrence A. 
Sullivan, Book Review, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1214, 1221 (1975) (reviewing MILTON 
HANDLER ET AL., TRADE REGULATION, CASES AND MATERIALS (1974)) (citing the 
second best problem as a predicate for stating “the emperor efficiency is stark naked”).  
Market-oriented scholars, it seems, barely acknowledge this challenge to their preferred 
paradigm because they sense that the most important distortions giving rise to the second 
best problem reflect misguided regulatory and other actions by government itself; market 
advocates might reasonably resent their opponents’ use of government-created market 
failures to justify an even bigger role for government in managing the economy.  Even so, 
the second best objection has forced economists to find other, less technical reasons for 
preferring competition to monopoly.  Third-best arguments for competition include 
dispersion of economic power and its encouragement of productive efficiency, quality, and 
innovation. 
 Most notably, the problem of second best strengthens rather than weakens the case for 
fostering price competition in a market where, as with insured health care, goods and 
services are effectively underpriced to consumers.  Thus, to the extent that the second best 
problem is that many goods and services are overpriced relative to their marginal cost of 
production, monopoly is certain to exacerbate the already serious misallocative effects of 
underpricing health services.  See Clark C. Havighurst, How the Health Care Revolution 
Fell Short, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2002, at 55, 80–82.  Allocative efficiency 
would be enhanced if U.S. health plans made their members face more cost and price 
differences, including those attributable to monopoly. 
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cost of protecting individuals against unpredictable, high-cost events.  
But American health insurers are significantly constrained in 
introducing contractual, administrative, and other measures to contain 
such costs.53  U.S.-style health insurance is therefore more destructive 
of allocative efficiency than health insurance has to be.  Although 
uncontrolled moral hazard is a problem throughout the health sector, 
combining inefficiently designed insurance with provider monopolies 
compounds the inefficiency—especially by making it easy for 
powerful, tax-exempt firms to finance even more questionable health 
spending.54 
As noted above, the minimal requirements for tax exemption 
provide no assurance that the extraordinary surpluses gained by 
nonprofit-hospital monopolists are spent only to address individuals’ 
or society’s most pressing needs.  Indeed, only if one takes the 
common but unthinking or self-serving view that health spending, like 
beauty, is its own excuse for being, is it possible to believe that 
nonprofit hospitals’ discretionary activities and projects necessarily 
represent socially appropriate uses for the resources consumed.  
Moreover, once tax-exempt hospitals capture surpluses from the 
payers of health insurance premiums, those resources are thereafter 
unavailable to meet even urgent non-health needs, individual or 
public as the case may be.  For several decades, ever since private 
insurance, Medicare, and Medicaid substantially reduced hospitals’ 
charitable burdens and began to pour new resources into health care, 
nonprofit monopolies have been channeling funds into health care 
uses that, other than being charitably labeled “charitable” for tax 
purposes, have never been reliably legitimized as priorities by either 
market or political processes.55  In the current deep recession, policies 
 
53 See supra note 46.  The impact of regulatory, legal, and contractual constraints on 
health insurers’ ability to contain moral hazard by stringently administering coverage can 
be appreciated by considering how far short today’s health plans fall of being in practice 
what they should be in theory: administrators of a common fund created by premium 
payers under contractual terms limiting the circumstances under which each of them may 
tap into it.  To be sure, administrative costs inevitably limit what can and should be done.  
See supra note 13.  But today, one sees virtually no explicit rationing of financing in the 
no-man’s-land of cost-benefit trade-offs and only occasional attempts to curb useless, 
“flat-of-the-curve” spending.  See Pauly, supra note 46. 
54 Technically, the freedom of health-sector monopolists to set supra-monopoly prices is 
also a consequence of moral hazard and of U.S. insurers’ inability, as a practical matter, to 
counteract its cost-increasing effects.  See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
55 In some states and situations, certain new discretionary spending by hospitals must be 
found worthy of a state-conferred “certificate of need” (CON).  For a convincing 
demonstration that CON laws were originally designed to legitimize, not to contain, 
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increasing spending on expensive but questionably or marginally 
valuable health services can only divert newly scarce (often 
borrowed) resources away from what many consumers or taxpayers 
might regard as far more essential uses. 
The extraordinary profitability of health-sector monopolies causes 
resource misallocation of still another kind by greatly strengthening 
the usual inducement for firms to seek market dominance.  Although 
some monopolies are earned by valuable innovation and other 
welfare-enhancing efforts, firms may also create and maintain market 
power in ways that waste scarce resources.  Indeed, Richard Posner 
has theorized that monopoly’s most serious misallocative effect is not, 
after all, the output reduction recognized in theoretical models; 
instead, he observes how the prospect of lucrative monopoly induces 
firms to invest heavily in striving to obtain, defend, and extend 
market power and that there is no assurance that such striving for 
dominance will not fritter away most of the surpluses potentially 
capturable from consumers.56  To be sure, firms’ general preference 
for reaping, rather than squandering, profits serves to ameliorate the 
potential for wasteful spending.57  But managers of nonprofit firms, 
though they have no interest in profits as such, have incentives to 
build larger empires to enhance their self-esteem and status in the 
community and to justify increased perquisites for themselves.58  
Such empire building is most easily accomplished by obtaining 
market power and using it to generate surpluses with which to further 
entrench and extend the firm’s dominance. 
In light of the large share of gross domestic product already being 
spent on health care in the United States compared to every other 
nation in the world, the negative consequences of health-sector 
 
increased health care spending in the interest of powerful health insurers and the hospital 
industry, see Sallyanne Payton & Rhoda M. Powsner, Regulation Through the Looking 
Glass: Hospitals, Blue Cross, and Certificate-of-Need, 79 MICH. L. REV. 203, 247–48 
(1980).  In any case, CON regulation mostly controls only the spending of money already 
earmarked for health care uses.  On CON regulation limiting new entry into hospitals’ 
various markets, see infra note 90. 
56 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 13–18 (2d ed. 
2001). 
57 William F. Baxter, Posner’s Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective, 8 BELL J. 
ECON. 609 (1977) (book review). 
58 Thomas J. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, Antitrust and the Not-for-Profit Sector 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12132, 2006), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12132.pdf.  Moreover, without freedom to distribute profits 
to owners or to pursue non-charitable purposes, managers of nonprofits have no alternative 
to reinvesting surpluses in health care. 
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monopolies for efficiency in the economy’s use of scarce resources 
provide an additional set of reasons to apply the antitrust laws with 
particular force against anticompetitive mergers and consolidations 
and other practices by which providers and suppliers of health 
services and goods can achieve, entrench, and enhance market power.  
If antitrust enforcement is not up to the task of restoring competition 
in markets where it is lacking, regulatory measures may be called for. 
IV 
HOW ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT FAILED IN HOSPITAL AND OTHER 
HEALTH CARE MARKETS 
Getting competition policy right in every hospital market would 
have been difficult in any event, even if antitrust enforcers and courts 
had fully appreciated how health insurance facilitates monopolists’ 
price gouging and if courts had possessed no illusions about the 
redistributive and allocative effects of nonprofit, tax-exempt 
hospitals.  Technically, the Clayton Act, because it prohibits any 
merger having an anticompetitive effect “in any line of commerce . . . 
in any section of the country,”59 would condemn any merger likely to 
cause net competitive harm in the market for even one of the many 
services that hospitals provide—unless some way could be found to 
avert the competitive harm, perhaps by spinning off a piece of the 
larger enterprise.  Nevertheless, estimating likely competitive effects 
of a merger in each of the merging hospitals’ many lines of business 
is a difficult and highly uncertain task.60  Moreover, many observers 
would naturally find it unreasonable to block a seemingly desirable 
merger simply because the merged firm would be dominant in one or 
two submarkets. 
Because of the difficulty of prospectively identifying and 
evaluating specific harms to competition from hospital mergers, 
antitrust enforcers and courts have been drawn to viewing the relevant 
“product market” not service-by-service but as a so-called “cluster 
 
59 15 U.S.C § 18 (2006). 
60 See U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, ch. 4, at 24.  
Although the Agencies currently doubt the advisability and practicability of 
conducting separate product market analyses for many discrete markets—
particularly when payors do not define the product they are purchasing in this 
fashion—the Agencies will continue to examine whether smaller product markets 
exist in addition to the traditional product market definition. 
Id. 
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market” for inpatient acute-care services.61  Although precedent and 
some logic support this approach,62 its averaging of concentration 
levels in many markets necessarily obscures high levels of 
concentration in some of them, thus allowing some mergers of 
doubtful legality to go unchallenged.63  Hospitals’ market power in 
such submarkets is also obscured by hospitals’ practice of negotiating  
a single formula for pricing all services together instead of separate 
prices for each service.64  By not pricing their monopolized services 
individually, hospitals can exercise their market power under the 
radar, charging high prices for everything rather than astronomical 
prices for those services for which there is no close (or perfect) 
substitute. 
Many hospital mergers also passed muster because efficiency 
considerations made them seem beneficial even when a very high 
level of concentration (measured by the government’s own 
guidelines) would result.  In the 1980s, antitrust policy began to be 
friendlier to corporate mergers of all kinds.  Specifically, merger 
analysis became explicitly receptive to efficiency claims and less 
concerned simply with preventing concentration.65  At the same time, 
 
61 See, e.g., In re Hosp. Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. 455 (1985), aff’d, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th 
Cir. 1986).  Although agencies and courts are always free to look behind the aggregate for 
effects in markets for discrete services, they rarely do so, despite the principle enshrined in 
the Clayton Act that a procompetitive effect in one market cannot justify anticompetitive 
effects in another.  See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 337 n.65 (1962); 
Phila. Nat’l Bank v. United States, 374 U.S. 321, 370 (1963) (rejecting the notion that 
“anticompetitive effects in one market could be justified by procompetitive consequences 
in another”). But see U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, 
ch. 4, at 24 (observing, as justification for using the cluster-market approach, that payers 
uniformly purchase bundled, not unbundled, hospital services); infra notes 85–90 and 
accompanying text. 
62 See generally Ian Ayres, Rationalizing Antitrust Cluster Markets, 95 YALE L.J. 109 
(1985) (observing that the cluster-market approach may be justified where goods or 
services are in some way complementary in production, consumption, or distribution). 
63 See David Dranove, Market Definition in Antitrust Analysis and Applications to 
Health Care, in MANAGED CARE AND CHANGING HEALTH CARE MARKETS 121, 139 
(Michael A. Morrisey ed., 1998) (finding “reasons to believe that traditional methods [of 
market definition] may create a bias in favor of [hospital] mergers that will turn out to 
harm consumers”). 
64 See supra note 45. 
65 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES § 4 (2010) (listing potential efficiencies from a proposed merger as a criterion 
to inform its enforcement decision).  But even if antitrust agencies and courts should 
respect efficiency claims in evaluating most mergers, they should treat such claims with 
special skepticism in the health sector.  Not only can health insurance be expected to 
exacerbate the price-increasing, redistributive effects of provider monopolies “in any line 
of commerce,” but the “problem of second best,” see supra note 52, suggests that, with 
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new Medicare payment policies and other factors were creating 
excess hospital capacity by shortening stays and shifting services to 
ambulatory settings; mergers may therefore have seemed a good way 
both to facilitate downsizing and to realize apparent economies of 
scale.66  In addition, because health insurers prior to that time had 
been largely passive payers rather than demanding purchasers, there 
was little empirical evidence to indicate that prices would be 
significantly higher if a market became concentrated.  Hospital 
managements, on the other hand, could foresee that consolidating to 
achieve market dominance would pay dividends if and when 
purchasers became hard bargainers.  The large number of hospital 
mergers essentially overwhelmed the ability of enforcers to scrutinize 
them with the requisite care.67  Numerous consolidations of physician 
practices, often under the auspices of hospitals seeking assured, non-
cost-conscious referrals, likewise eluded antitrust scrutiny.68 
Thus, many factors besides certain judges’ sanguine attitude 
toward nonprofit monopolies contributed to what should now 
appear—once one recognizes the extraordinary pricing freedom that 
U.S.-style health insurance confers on monopolist providers and 
suppliers—to have been a colossally important failure of antitrust 
enforcement.  Today, in large part because of hospital mergers and 
other consolidations, there are few markets in which price 
competition keeps prices for specific hospital and other health care 
services and goods near their marginal cost.69 
 
health insurance substantially lowering the prices patients pay, a strict antimerger policy is 
virtually certain to enhance allocative efficiency.  Efficiency in the production of goods or 
services need not be deemed procompetitive for antitrust purposes if the resources being 
employed are likely to have better uses elsewhere in the economy. 
66 But see supra notes 42, 65. 
67 See Vogt, supra note 6 (reporting more than 900 mergers and acquisitions among 
U.S. hospitals, such that “[m]any cities came to be dominated by two or three large 
hospital systems”).  Between 1987 and 1991, for example, the FTC challenged only five of 
some 227 hospital mergers.  Ironically, the enforcement agencies have sometimes cited the 
small percentage of hospital mergers they have challenged as evidence of how reasonable 
their enforcement policy has been.  See Health Care Reform: Do Antitrust Laws 
Discourage Cost Cutters or Defeat Price Gougers?: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 
1st Sess., at 27 (1993) (prepared statement of Janet D. Steiger, FTC Chairman). 
68 See, e.g., Meredith B. Rosenthal et al., Managed Care and Market Power: Physician 
Organizations in Four Markets, 20 HEALTH AFF. 187 (2001); Berenson et al., supra note 
14. 
69 See supra note 6. 
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V 
A NEW ANTITRUST OR REGULATORY AGENDA? 
Is there anything that government, through antitrust enforcement or 
otherwise, can now do about the problem of provider and supplier 
market power in health care markets?  Although the enforcement 
agencies and courts should certainly scrutinize new hospital mergers 
and similar consolidations with greater skepticism, preventing new 
mergers cannot correct past failures to maintain competition in 
hospital and other markets.  To be sure, enforcers may challenge the 
legality of previously consummated mergers, as the FTC did in the 
Evanston Northwestern case, but there are practical and judicial 
difficulties in fashioning a remedy that might restore the competition 
that the original merger destroyed.  The FTC was unwilling, for 
example, to demand the dissolution of Evanston Northwestern 
Healthcare Corp. and instead merely ordered its jointly operated 
hospitals to negotiate separate contracts with health plans—a remedy, 
incidentally, that gave the negotiating team of neither hospital any 
reason to attract business from the other.70  Although the FTC might 
seek more substantial relief in other such cases, the general rule seems 
to be that old, unlawful mergers are amenable to later breakup only in 
the unusual case where the component parts have not been 
significantly integrated.71  In any case, given their past skepticism 
about antitrust enforcement in health care markets, courts would be 
hard to enlist in an antitrust campaign to roll back earlier 
consolidations.  A policy agenda capable of redressing the provider 
monopoly problem in health care will need to employ other legal and 
regulatory instruments. 
A.  The Special Problem of Accountable Care Organizations 
A first order of business in fighting provider market power is to 
prevent accountable care organizations (ACOs) from aggregating 
such power.  The PPACA encourages providers to integrate 
themselves in ACOs for the purpose of implementing “best practices” 
 
70 Despite losing thoroughly on the merits, the respondent declared itself “thrilled” with 
the FTC’s remedy.  FTC Ruling Keeps Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Intact, N. 
SHORE UNIV. HEALTH SYS. (Aug. 6, 2007), http://www.northshore.org/about-us/press 
/press-releases/press-release-archives/ftc-ruling-keeps-evanston-northwestern-healthcare   
-intact.aspx. 
71 E.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957); see also 
PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD TURNER, 5 ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1205b (2000). 
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and thereby providing coordinated care of good quality at low cost.72  
As an inducement for providers to form and practice within these 
presumptively more efficient entities, the PPACA instructs the 
Medicare program to share with an ACO any cost savings it can 
demonstrate.73  Observers are now expressing concern, however, that 
ACOs—whatever their value to Medicare may be—will attain and 
exercise substantial market power vis-à-vis private health plans.74  
The New York Times has reported “a growing frenzy of mergers 
involving hospitals, clinics and doctor groups eager to share costs and 
savings, and cash in on the [ACO program’s] incentives.”75  In fact, 
providers’ main purpose in forming ACOs may not be to achieve cost 
savings to be shared with Medicare but to strengthen their market 
power over purchasers in the private sector. 
Although the PPACA appears designed to achieve the benefits of 
vertical integration for Medicare and its beneficiaries, it inevitably 
invites horizontal integration that creates new market power in private 
markets.76  The formation of ACOs should therefore be subject to 
 
72 See generally Stephen M. Shortell et al., How the Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Innovation Should Test Accountable Care Organizations, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1293 (2010).  
Health policy experts have long recognized the benefits of vertically integrating providers 
working at different stages of the delivery system—primary care physicians, nurse 
practitioners, various specialists, outpatient clinics, hospitals, and pharmacies.  Coupled 
with user-friendly information technology and compensation systems that reward efficient 
practice, vertical integration can enable professional and institutional providers to 
coordinate and rationalize their efforts with the goal of delivering high-quality, low-cost, 
patient-centered care.  See, e.g., Alain C. Enthoven & Laura A. Tollen, Competition in 
Health Care: It Takes Systems to Pursue Quality and Efficiency, HEALTH AFF., WEB 
EXCLUSIVE, W5-420, Sept. 7, 2005, http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2005/09 
/07/hlthaff.w5.420.full.pdf+html. Conversely, there are recognized harms from 
maintaining a fragmented health care system.  See EINER ELHAUGE, THE 
FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE (2010). 
73 PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 3022, 10307, 124 Stat. 119, 395–99, 940–41 
(2010).  Just how savings and quality are to be measured and rewarded—both seemingly 
daunting tasks—remains to be determined in regulations due by January 2012. 
74 AM.’S HEALTH INS. PLANS, ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS AND MARKET 
POWER ISSUES (2010); Berenson et al., supra note 14, at 1 (noting ACOs’ “potential not 
only to produce higher quality at lower cost but also to exacerbate the trend toward greater 
provider market power”); Jeff Goldsmith, Analyzing Shifts in Economic Risks to Providers 
in Proposed Payment and Delivery System Reforms, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1299, 1304 (2010) 
(“Whether the savings from better care coordination for Medicare patients will be offset by 
much higher costs to private insurers of a seemingly inevitable . . . wave of provider 
consolidation remains to be seen.”). 
75 Pear, supra note 7. 
76 Indeed, one provision in the PPACA seems to necessitate powerful combinations in 
smaller markets by requiring an ACO to include enough providers to care for at least 5000 
Medicare beneficiaries.  42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(b)(2)(D).  Enacted with the Medicare 
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close antitrust scrutiny.77  As noted, the new law provides a strong 
predicate for ACOs’ efficiency claims, which, under conventional 
antitrust reasoning, can trump concern about concentration on the 
seller side of the market.  Nevertheless, it is our position that 
conventional reasoning should not guide antitrust evaluations of 
mergers and consolidations in health care markets.  Instead, our 
observation that health insurance greatly exacerbates the 
anticonsumer, redistributive, and misallocative effects of monopoly 
provides a strong warrant for an especially stringent anti-
concentration, antimerger policy in the health care sector.78  
Notwithstanding the special efficiency claims that can be made on 
behalf of ACOs, therefore, we believe their presumed efficiencies 
should count for little in appraising an ACO’s likely market impact. 
To be sure, claims of private-sector efficiencies cannot be wholly 
ignored in antitrust analyses of ACOs.  They should be viewed with 
skepticism, however.  The efficiencies expected of ACOs flow 
mostly, after all, from vertical integration of providers, not from 
combining competitors horizontally.  Antitrust authorities might 
therefore reasonably oppose any ACO formation that increases 
horizontal concentration to a troublesome level “in any line of 
commerce.”  Such concentration matters because, especially with 
health insurance in the picture, consumers cannot expect to realize 
savings from ACOs’ putative efficiencies unless providers of nearly 
all services face active competition in selling to cost-conscious 
private payers.79  In any event, ACO efficiencies from vertical 
 
program principally in mind, this provision should not be read as a congressional 
relaxation of antitrust constraints on ACO formation.  Indeed, antitrust enforcement 
against ACOs in smaller markets might encourage Congress to modify its anticompetitive 
requirement and perhaps even to adopt new regulatory protections for competition in 
private markets. 
77 In the absence of an explicit statutory exemption or directive, any benefits to 
Medicare should carry no weight in an antitrust analysis of an ACO’s effect on 
competition.  Accordingly, physicians and hospitals organizing ACOs have asked federal 
officials for exemptions.  Pear, supra note 7. 
78 To see how our observation has yet to inform discussions of ACO market power, 
consider the following understatement appearing (twice) in a recent white paper on ACOs 
issued by the health insurance industry’s principal trade association: “As with other 
industries, health care is not immune from the laws of market power and its impact on 
competition.”  AM.’S HEALTH INS. PLANS, supra note 74, at 1, 3.  A deeper analysis would 
emphasize that health care is not like other industries because powerful providers of 
insured services have unique opportunities to exploit the consuming public. 
79 On how bundling services for negotiating purposes allows monopoly to infect all 
prices, see supra note 45 and infra notes 85–90 and accompanying text.  It is unlikely that 
there would be any efficiency antitrust defense for an otherwise objectionable merger if 
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integration should be regarded as speculative in particular cases—and 
not merely because reformers’ hopes and dreams do not always 
translate automatically into real-world improvements but may instead 
have unintended consequences.80  Although integrated delivery 
systems have developed spontaneously in the past and serve as 
models for the reformers’ aspirations, efforts to replicate those early 
successes have often failed in part because many physicians are 
reluctant to forgo the lucrative possibilities of unconstrained fee-for-
service practice.81  Moreover, many ACOs are reportedly being 
sponsored by hospitals, which any efficient delivery system would 
use sparingly and which may therefore be moving to preempt control 
of ACOs so any cost savings will come at the expense of others and 
not themselves. 
In order for antitrust law and regulation to effectively contest the 
formation of powerful ACOs, a proposed ACO ought to go through a 
rigorous pre-approval process like that routinely employed in 
screening large corporate mergers under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act.82  
Because of the large number of proposed consolidations and joint 
ventures and because screening them for effects in discrete 
submarkets—as opposed to arbitrarily defined cluster markets—is a 
 
the savings from expected efficiencies achieved are unlikely to benefit consumers in the 
form of lower prices.  The government’s position is that “efficiencies almost never justify 
a merger to monopoly or near-monopoly.”  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, supra note 65, at § 10, accord Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Univ. Health, Inc. 938 
F.2d 1206, 1223 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[A] defendant who seeks to overcome a presumption 
that a proposed acquisition would substantially lessen competition must demonstrate that 
the intended acquisition would result in significant economies and that these economies 
ultimately would benefit competition and, hence, consumers.”).  With health insurance 
increasing the magnitude of monopolists’ price increases, there is little prospect of 
consumer benefit unless price competition remains robust in virtually all submarkets.  For 
this reason and also because the excessive cost of health care in the United States already 
amounts to several whole percentage points of gross domestic product, see, e.g., 
Havighurst & Richman, supra note 9, at 11 n.8, and is mostly attributable to the monopoly 
prices charged for provider services, see infra note 98, antitrust agencies and courts have 
ample reasons to attack concentration head-on.  Although providers will argue that 
consumers will benefit as patients from the quality improvements ACOs are expected to 
achieve, new dollar costs to consumers are a far more certain consequence of overly 
powerful ACOs. 
80 Shortell et al., supra note 72 (suggesting how the heavy hand of bureaucracy may be 
needed to improve the chances that ACOs will succeed in improving Medicare as the 
reformers hope). 
81 See Havighurst, supra note 52, at 64–67. 
82 15 U.S.C. §18a (2006).  Hospital mergers and mergers of medical practices have 
generally been too small to meet Hart-Scott-Rodino dollar and other thresholds for prior 
notification to the antitrust agencies. 
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labor-intensive job, the burden of showing an absence of significant 
horizontal effects in local submarkets might reasonably be assigned to 
an ACO’s proponents.  As is common in screening other mergers, 
antitrust officials should be open to possibilities for curing 
concentration problems by spinning off certain services or by 
excluding some proposed participants from the joint venture.  
Nonexclusive contractual arrangements with certain ACO providers, 
which allow them to participate freely in competing networks, might 
often lessen antitrust concerns. 
Additional protection against ACOs’ exercise of market power vis-
à-vis private purchasers could also be provided in Medicare’s 
forthcoming regulations governing ACOs.  For example, Medicare 
might bar an ACO from marketing to private payers until it has 
demonstrated its ability to achieve quality improvements and 
substantial cost savings for Medicare itself.83  In addition, the 
Medicare program might condition its sharing of savings with an 
ACO on the latter’s demonstration that its prices to private payers 
have not increased due to an increase in its market power in any 
market.  One might wonder, of course, whether a governmental single 
payer like Medicare would ever have the mission, the impulse, or the 
requisite creativity to be helpful in making private markets for health 
services effectively competitive.  The more likely scenario, 
unfortunately, is that Medicare will be happy to see costs shifted to 
the private sector—and may even reward ACOs’ cost shifting as cost 
savings.84 
Not only does the public interest require that law and regulation 
contest the formation of powerful new ACOs, but measures must also 
be taken to weaken the strategic positions of existing systems with 
ACO-like characteristics.  The following subsections suggest some 
 
83 An antitrust court also might suspend operation of an ACO in the private sector until 
it could show that it saved money for Medicare. 
84 To be sure, the notion of “cost shifting”—the idea that providers can readily raise 
their prices to private payers to recoup whatever they may lose because Medicare decides 
to pay them less—has been discredited because even a monopolist provider would most 
likely be charging private payers a profit-maximizing price already.  See Havighurst & 
Richman, supra note 9, at 22 n.40.  But an ACO program that allows Medicare to realize 
cost savings by fostering increases in providers’ market power vis-à-vis the private sector 
(and thus the prices it could profitably charge) would represent a kind of cost-shift on 
Medicare’s part.  Just as the FTC in the Evanston Northwestern merger case used post-
merger prices to show that the merger created new market power and should have been 
prohibited when it occurred, Medicare might insist that a newly formed ACO be 
“accountable” for its prices to private payers before Medicare’s cost savings are treated as 
net social ones. 
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additional ways (besides enlisting Medicare in policing ACO market 
power) in which antitrust principles and regulatory powers might be 
employed to strengthen price competition in markets already featuring 
dominant providers. 
B.  Requiring Unbundling of Monopolized Services 
As a strategy to restore competition in health care markets, antitrust 
enforcers might focus their efforts on requiring hospitals and other 
provider entities to unbundle, at a purchaser’s request, their 
competitive and monopolized services for purposes of negotiating 
prices.  Although there has been no enforcement effort aimed at 
hospitals’ tying their services together in bargaining with private 
payers,85 such tying should be vulnerable to antitrust attack even if 
bundling generally makes for efficient negotiating.86  The general 
antitrust rule on tying is that a firm with market power may not use it 
to force customers to purchase possibly unwanted goods or services.87  
If this principle could be invoked to frustrate hospitals’ practice of 
negotiating a comprehensive pricing formula for large bundles of 
their services, purchasers could then bargain down the prices of those 
services having good substitutes.88  If a hospital still wished to fully 
exploit its various monopolies, it would have to do so discreetly, 
 
85 In a private suit, a dominant hospital chain was sued by its lone rival for, among other 
things, bundling primary and secondary services with tertiary care in selling to the area’s 
insurers.  See Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 890–91 (9th Cir. 
2008).  The district court permitted certain claims to proceed to trial, including a claim of 
illegal bundled discounts, but dismissed the tying claim. 
86 Einer Elhauge has recently advocated stricter enforcement of the rule against tying.  
See Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly 
Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397 (2009).  His reasoning confirms our sense that 
permitting a hospital monopolist to tie unrelated services expands the monopoly’s reach, 
profitability, and longevity and harms consumer welfare.  We would further argue that, 
even though there are some efficiencies from bundling, antitrust law should permit a 
purchaser to demand separate prices where the added cost of bargaining service by service 
is offset by the prospect of lower prices.  See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 96 (2007), available at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO 
/LPS81352 (“In the case of de facto tying, while consumers are free to buy components 
separately, the components are priced to make it more attractive to buy the bundled 
components together.  Under this theory, the prices of the components are actually 
increased, including the stand-alone price of the monopolized good.  Thus, instead of 
receiving a discount, consumers are actually paying more for the bundled products.”). 
87 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). 
88 The ability to leverage market power in one sub-market into price increases in a 
competitive market helps explain wide price variation for like services in common 
geographic markets.  See GINSBURG, supra note 48.   
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making its highest prices visible.  Health plans could then hope to 
realize significant savings by challenging such monopolies, which 
they could do by adopting purchasing policies and enrollee incentives 
designed to expand the geographic market or encourage new entry.  
For example, a health plan might provide substantially more favorable 
coverage (lower copayments, for example) for patients willing to seek 
certain treatments farther from home89 or at a startup facility.  Even 
where certificate-of-need regulation bars free entry,90 an insurer’s 
favorable long-term contract with a prospective entrant, entered into 
to avoid paying a monopolist’s high price, might serve (assuming an 
enlightened regulator) to establish “need” for a competitive 
 
89 Some self-insured employers have already pursued the promise of searching outside 
local markets to provide health care for their employees.  North Carolina-based Lowe’s 
Company, Inc., for example, now encourages its employees to travel to the Cleveland 
Clinic for heart procedures, citing the Clinic’s superior outcomes and lower costs 
compared to local providers.  See Harlan Spector, Lowe’s Will Bring Its Workers to 
Cleveland Clinic for Heart Surgery, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Feb. 17, 2010, 
http://www.cleveland.com/healthfit/index.ssf/2010/02/post_27.html (“The arrangement 
was attractive enough that Lowe's will pay travel and lodging expenses for patients and a 
companion, and waive a $500 deductible and other out-of-pocket costs.”).  Insurers, not 
just self-insured employers, are also searching for out-of-network providers to provide 
care for their subscribers.  See Mayo Clinic and UnitedHealthcare Announce New Network 
Relationship, MAYO CLINIC (Oct. 7, 2010), http://www.mayoclinic.org/news2010-rst/5993 
.html (announcing that United Healthcare’s insureds across the United States can seek care 
from Mayo Clinic physicians and hospitals as in-network subscribers); Jennifer Lubell, 
New Tourist Attractions, MODERN HEALTHCARE, June 15, 2009, at 28 (reporting that 
many specialty hospitals in the United States are seeking to attract patients from U.S. 
insurance companies and other medical intermediaries).  U.S. insurers are also sending 
their subscribers abroad.  See M.P. McQueen, Paying Workers to Go Abroad for Health 
Care, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122273570173688551 
.html (“Insured Americans are starting to see some unusual options in their health-provider 
networks: doctors and hospitals in Singapore, Costa Rica and other foreign destinations.”).  
Providers outside the United States, in the Cayman Islands and India, for example, are 
similarly marketing themselves to self-insured employers and insurers seeking high-
quality services at competitive prices for their subscribers.  See Geeta Anand, The Henry 
Ford of Heart Surgery, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12587 
5892887958111.html (detailing plans to build a 2000-bed general hospital in the Cayman 
Islands where “[p]rocedures, both elective and necessary, will be priced at least [fifty 
percent] lower than what they cost in the U.S.”); Barak D. Richman et al., Lessons from 
India in Organizational Innovation: A Tale of Two Heart Hospitals, 27 HEALTH AFF. 
1260 (2008). 
90 A continually debated issue is the appropriateness of employing CON laws or other 
measures to prevent specialty hospitals and ambulatory surgical facilities from competing 
with full-service hospitals.  See, e.g., Clark C. Havighurst, From the Field: Monopoly Is 
Not the Answer, HEALTH AFF., WEB EXCLUSIVE, W5-373, Aug. 9, 2005, available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/abstract/hlthaff.w5.373; Sujit Choudhry et al., 
MarketWatch: Specialty Versus Community Hospitals: What Role for the Law?, HEALTH 
AFF., WEB EXCLUSIVE, Aug. 9, 2005, available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi 
/content/abstract/hlthaff.w5.361. 
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alternative to a dominant provider.  In fact, the mere threat of new 
entry would often be sufficient to modify the monopolist’s demands. 
Unfortunately, inevitable litigation delays and legal uncertainty 
provide good reasons not to rely exclusively on antitrust law to 
promptly and effectively preclude provider monopolists from 
exercising their market power over some services by bundling them 
with others in dealing with purchasers.  However, at some level, 
properly empowered regulators could enable individual payers to 
demand unbundling in particular cases in order to facilitate their 
efforts to get better prices, both in submarkets where monopoly is not 
a problem and also where it is.  Of course, one hopes that antitrust 
courts and a credible threat of treble damages would discourage a 
provider monopolist from retaliating against any purchaser that 
aggressively challenges its dominant position and the anticompetitive 
practices used to maintain it. 
C.  Challenging Anticompetitive Terms in Insurer-Provider Contracts 
Restrictive terms in contracts between providers and insurers are 
another potentially fruitful area for antitrust and regulatory attention 
in dealing with the provider monopoly problem.  A common practice, 
for example, is for a provider-seller to promise to give an insurer-
buyer the same discount from its high prices as any it might give to a 
competing health plan.  Such price-protection, payment-parity, or 
“most-favored-nation” (MFN) clauses are common in commercial 
contracts and serve to obviate frequent and costly renegotiation of 
prices.  Their efficiency benefits may sometimes be outweighed by 
anticompetitive effects, however.  Thus, a provider monopolist may 
find that a large and important payer is willing to pay its very high 
prices only if the provider promises to charge no lower prices to its 
competitors.  Such a situation apparently arose in Massachusetts, 
where the commonwealth’s largest insurer, a Blue Cross plan, 
reportedly acceded to Partners HealthCare’s demand for a very 
substantial price increase only after Partners agreed to “protect Blue 
Cross from [its] biggest fear: that Partners would allow other insurers 
to pay less.”91 
 
91 A Handshake That Made Healthcare History, supra note 30.  The Massachusetts 
Attorney General has noted that such payment-parity agreements have become 
“pervasive” in provider-insurer contracts in the commonwealth and has expressed concern 
that “such agreements may lock in payment levels and prevent innovation and competition 
based on pricing.”  HEALTH CARE COST TRENDS, supra note 27, at 40–41. 
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Antitrust law may well offer some remedy against a provider 
monopolist agreeing to an MFN clause to induce a powerful insurer to 
pay its high prices.  But the availability of that remedy (which would 
probably be only a prospective cease-and-desist order rather than an 
award of treble damages for identifiable harms) might not be 
sufficient to deter a powerful provider from granting MFN status to a 
dominant insurer.  Regulatory authorities, however, could presumably 
prohibit dominant providers from conferring such status.  Such 
agreements by providers, by restricting their freedom to cut price 
deals with a preferred customer’s competitors, reduce pressure on, 
and opportunities for, all insurers to “get the best deal possible.”92  
Protected against their competitors’ getting better deals, insurers are 
likely to give in too quickly to monopolists’ price demands. 
A more potent antitrust attack on anticompetitive MFN clauses 
would aim at the dominant insurer demanding them, rather than at the 
cooperating provider.  The Department of Justice (DOJ) has recently 
sued Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, a dominant insurer, to 
enjoin it from using MFN clauses in its contracts with Michigan 
hospitals; the DOJ alleged that such restrictions on provider price 
competition have reduced competition in the insurance market by 
preventing other insurers from negotiating favorable hospital 
contracts.93  Because the MFN clauses in the Michigan case are 
alleged—and seem likely—to have raised prices paid by Blue Cross’s 
competitors and by self-insured employers, they provide promising 
targets not just for public enforcement but also for private treble-
damage actions by injured purchasers, in which damages are 
measured by the higher costs that the restrictions have forced them to 
incur.  Indeed, in the wake of the government’s initiative in Michigan, 
the threat of private lawsuits should quickly end the use of MFN 
agreements by large insurers.94  In Massachusetts, for example, the 
 
92 See infra note 94. 
93 See Complaint at 1-2, United States v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich. (E.D. Mich. 
2010) (No. 2:10-CV-14155); see also David S. Hilzenrath, U.S. Files Antitrust Suit 
Against Michigan Blue Cross Blue Shield, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2010, http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/18/AR2010101805257.html. 
94 Dominant insurers may have felt free to impose MFN clauses on providers because 
the courts have not made clear when, as a matter of antitrust law, they may not.  Cf. Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1415 (7th Cir. 
1995) (qualifing the court’s earlier blanket approval of MFNs by adding the following 
sentence to its opinion: “Perhaps, as the Department of Justice believes, [MFN] clauses are 
misused to anticompetitive ends in some cases; but there is no evidence of that in this 
case.”).  In four significant cases brought by private plaintiffs, federal appellate courts 
have upheld practices of Blue Cross or Blue Shield plans that, in the court’s view, seemed 
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Blue Cross plan should now think long and hard before renewing (or 
enforcing) the MFN clause in its contract with Partners HealthCare. 
Other contract provisions that threaten price competition are also in 
use in provider-insurer contracts in Massachusetts, according to the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney General.95  In particular, so-called “anti-
steering” provisions prohibit an insurer from creating insurance 
products in which patients are induced to patronize lower-priced 
providers.  Under such a contractual constraint, a health plan could 
not offer more generous coverage—such as reduced cost-sharing—for 
care obtained from a new market entrant or from a more distant, 
perhaps even an out-of-state or out-of-country, provider.96  Other 
contractual terms in use in Massachusetts (and presumably in other 
jurisdictions as well) guarantee a dominant provider that it will not be 
excluded from any provider network that the health plan might offer 
its subscribers. 
The contractual terms noted here all have the potential to foreclose 
opportunities for consumers to benefit, both directly as patients and 
indirectly as premium payers, from innovative insurance products that 
competing health plans might otherwise introduce.  Not only might 
antitrust rules be interpreted to prohibit the use of such 
anticompetitive contract terms to protect provider monopolies and 
curb insurer innovation, but insurance regulators might bar such 
provisions wherever they threaten to preclude effective price 
 
intended only to assure them favorable prices.  Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 883 F.2d 1101 (1st Cir. 1989); Ball Mem. Hosp., Inc. v. 
Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1986); Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., 749 
F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross of W. Pa., 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 
1973).  In the two cases brought by a competitor of the Blue defendant, however, the court 
badly misread the evidence.  Thus, in Travelers (the case from which the courts in Kartell 
and Ocean State quoted language approving efforts to “get the best deal possible”), the 
payer was acting in tacit collusion with a hospital cartel, not driving hard bargains with 
individual hospitals.  See CLARK C. HAVIGHURST ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND 
POLICY: READINGS, NOTES, AND QUESTIONS 1345–52 (2d ed. 1998); Clark C. Havighurst, 
The Questionable Cost-Containment Record of Commercial Health Insurers, in HEALTH 
CARE IN AMERICA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HOSPITALS AND HEALTH INSURANCE 
221, 251–52 (H.E. French III ed., 1988).  Likewise, in Ocean State, the Blue Shield plan’s 
MFN clause should have been read not as an effort to pay physicians less but as an offer to 
pay them more if they ceased discounting their services to a competing HMO that was 
threatening the defendant’s position as virtually the sole marketing agent for physicians in 
Rhode Island.  See HAVIGHURST ET AL., supra, at 1360–72.  It is probable that the 
government’s case in Michigan will confirm the anticompetitive character of MFN clauses 
used pervasively by a dominant insurer, thus laying groundwork for future private actions 
and effectively deterring the objectionable practice. 
95 See HEALTH CARE COST TRENDS, supra note 27, at 40–44. 
96 See supra note 89. 
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competition.  In at least some cases, the latter regulatory course may 
be preferable to reliance on cumbersome antitrust remedies, 
especially if the deterrent effect of private, treble-damage suits seems 
insufficient to increase insurers’ incentive and opportunities to 
innovate. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
As stated at the outset, our purpose here has been to call attention 
to the unusually serious consequences, for both consumers and the 
general welfare, of monopolies in health care markets.  Our main 
point, however, is not merely that monopoly is ubiquitous in such 
markets—although we have pointed to some evidence that it is 
ubiquitous, particularly when so-called cluster markets are 
disaggregated into discrete submarkets for particular services.  Nor 
have we intended to attribute the prevalence of health care provider 
market power principally to past failures of antitrust enforcement—
although we have stressed the difficulty the government has had in 
preventing anticompetitive mergers of nonprofit hospitals and the 
consolidation of physician practices. 97  Our principal point is that 
health insurance, especially as it is designed and administered in the 
United States, hugely expands monopolists’ pricing freedom, making 
monopoly’s wealth-redistributing and misallocative effects 
substantially more serious than monopoly’s effects usually are.  
Although this point has been almost completely absent from the 
antitrust and economics literature,98 its importance would seem to 
 
97 We are cognizant, for example, that market power exists in many health care markets 
and submarkets because of economies of scale (creating natural-monopoly conditions), 
entry barriers, exclusionary licensure or CON requirements, significant product 
differentiation, valid patents, trade secrets, and first-mover advantages.  For an assortment 
of reasons, some provider monopolies are an inescapable fact of life in U.S. health care. 
98 Although scholars have previously observed that prices for health services are much 
higher in the United States compared to other nations in the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (without observable differences in quality), see, e.g., 
Gerard Anderson et al., It’s the Prices, Stupid: Why the United States Is So Different from 
Other Countries, 22 HEALTH AFF. 89 (2003), and although many have observed that 
provider market power is a factor in inflating those prices, see supra note 6, few have 
observed the synergistic effects of monopoly and health insurance.  Indeed, although 
Anderson et al. note “varying degrees of monopoly power on the sell side of the market,” 
their only other suggested explanation for high prices is that “the buy side of the U.S. 
health system is relatively weak by international standards.”  Anderson et al., supra, at 
102.  The authors seem not to recognize that health insurance itself raises monopolists’ 
prices or that the private “buy side” is especially (for reasons given supra notes 44–50 and 
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dwarf all other considerations in accounting for the extraordinarily 
high cost of U.S. health care.99 
To mitigate the harms from provider market power, we advise 
vigorous, rather than tentative or circumspect, enforcement of the 
antitrust laws.  Retrospective scrutiny of earlier horizontal mergers of 
hospitals or other providers could help correct decades of ineffectual 
enforcement.  An antitrust or regulatory initiative to curb hospitals’ 
tying practices and to prohibit anticompetitive contracts between 
payers and providers—perhaps as remedies for earlier mergers found 
unlawful after the fact—might also significantly reduce the 
extraordinary pricing freedom that hospital and other monopolists 
enjoy by virtue of U.S.-style health insurance.100  By enabling 
competing health plans to bypass, or foster new competitors for, local 
monopolists, such antitrust or regulatory actions could promote price 
competition where it is currently lacking. 
Unfortunately, health insurers are far less eager to contest provider 
market power and to act as aggressive purchasing agents of 
consumers than they would be if consumers were both aware of the 
true cost of their health coverage and conscious that they, rather than 
someone else, are paying for it.101  Currently, when it comes to their 
health care, insured consumers are unduly reluctant to accept anything 
less than the very best.  U.S. health plans are therefore inadequately 
incentivized to reduce costs and overly hesitant to adopt innovative 
strategies with associated legal or political risks.  Any hopefulness we 
may have about the future of U.S. health care is tempered by doubts 
 
accompanying text), although not inevitably, helpless in fighting cost battles in the U.S. 
system. 
99 Excess health care spending in the United States was recently estimated to be $650 
billion per year, equal to nearly five percent of gross domestic product.  See ERIC JENSEN 
& LENNY MENDONCA, NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT. FOUND., WHY AMERICA 
SPENDS MORE ON HEALTH CARE (2009), available at http://nihcm.org/pdf/EV_Jensen 
Mendonca_FINAL.pdf. 
100 But see U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, ch. 4, at 
24 (observing that insurers generally prefer to purchase bundled, not unbundled, hospital 
services). 
101 The inefficiency of U.S. private health insurance arises in large measure because the 
tax system treats employer-provided coverage as a tax-free benefit, with the result that 
workers tend to lose sight of the full cost of their coverage and are therefore reluctant, both 
as consumers and as voters, to tolerate any measure that might facilitate economizing.  
Health insurers are therefore in a poor position, particularly in the politicized regulatory 
environment they confront, to act as cost-conscious purchasing agents for consumers in 
contesting provider market power. See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 9, at 36–39; 
supra notes 44–50 and accompanying text. 
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about the ability and willingness of U.S. health insurers to take the 
aggressive actions needed to procure appropriate, affordable care. 
The PPACA, by providing conventionally generous health 
insurance to around thirty million more Americans, has the potential 
to enshrine the significant shortcomings of such insurance.  Not only 
does the new law itself seems to have no effective answer to the 
problem of provider/supplier monopoly,102 but its broad extension of 
coverage is likely to further amplify the uniquely harmful effects of 
provider and supplier market power.  Whatever the PPACA may 
achieve, its legacy and cost to the nation will depend largely on 
whether market actors, regulators, and antitrust enforcers can 
effectively address the provider monopoly problem.  In the near 
future, the cost problem may become so serious that the temptation to 
adopt drastic measures, such as direct price controls, will be 
irresistible.103  Competition-oriented policies are still available, 
however, and could yield substantial benefits both to premium payers 
and to an economy that badly needs to find the most efficient uses for 
newly limited resources. 
 
102 Indeed, by encouraging hospitals and physicians to combine forces to create ACOs, 
the PPACA may actually prompt and enable providers to gain more market power.  See 
supra note 13. 
103 Some generally market-oriented scholars have already concluded that “[b]ecause 
antitrust policy has proved ineffective in curbing . . . providers’ market power to win 
higher payments, policy makers need to consider approaches including price caps and all-
payer rate setting.”  Berenson et al., supra note 14. 
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